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ABSTRACT
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is deeply entrenched in psychologists’ and
economists’thinking. Knight (1921), towhom it is frequently attributed,however, went
beyond this dichotomy. Within the domain of risk, he set apart a priori and statistical
probabilities, a distinction that maps onto that between decisions from description and
experience, respectively. We argue this distinction is important because risky choices
basedonapriori(described)andstatistical(experienced) probabilitiescansubstantially
diverge. To understand why, we examine various possible contributing factors to the
description–experience gap. We ﬁnd that payoff variability and memory limitations
play only a small role in the emergence of the gap. In contrast, the presence of rare
events and their representation as either natural frequencies in decisions from experi-
ence or single-event probabilities in decisions from description appear relevant for the
gap. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words decisions; experience; information representation; rare events; risk and
uncertainty; risky choice; sampling
INTRODUCTION
In the early 20th century, Frank Hyneman Knight drew a conceptual map that has, to this day, shaped
psychologists’ and economists’ thinking about the world of uncertainty in which we live. In his book Risk,
Uncertainty, and Proﬁt, Knight (1921, p. 224) distinguished between different types of ‘‘probability
situation.’’ The two situations that have attracted most attention are risk and uncertainty (see e.g., Edwards,
1954;Epstein&Wang,1994;Lopes,1983;Luce,2000;Luce&Raiffa,1957).Riskhastypicallybeenusedto
describe situations in which ‘‘probabilities are available to guide choice,’’ and uncertainty to describe
situations in which ‘‘information is too imprecise to be summarized adequately by probabilities’’ (Epstein &
Wang, 1994, p. 283), or, as Tversky and Fox (1995) put it, ‘‘Following Knight (1921), decision theorists
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Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.distinguish between risky (or chance) prospects where the probabilities associated with outcomes
are assumed to be known, and uncertain prospects where these probabilities are not assumed to be known’’
(p. 270). This dichotomy has now become deeply ingrained in economic and psychological theory.
Although dichotomies promise to bring order to chaos, they do so at the cost of being simplistic (Barbe,
2001). Sometimes they are even suspected of impeding theoretical progress (Newell, 1973). Knight’s (1921)
view, upon re-examination, was subtler than the simple risk versus uncertainty dichotomy (Runde, 1998).
Rather than a dichotomy, he proposed a trichotomy of situations, which differ with regard to how easy or
difﬁcult it is to determine the likelihood of an event in question. Speciﬁcally, he distinguished between
situations where people can use (a) a priori probabilities, (b) statistical probabilities, or (c) estimates
(see pp. 224 and 225). A priori probabilities refer to situations where events result from a precisely known
random mechanism, so that the probability of an event occurring can easily be assigned via mathematical
calculation,asindeducingtheprobabilityofgettingasixwhenthrowingafairdie.Statisticalprobabilities,in
contrast, refer to situations where probabilities cannot be calculated exactly, but assessed in an empirical
manner. Consider Lopes’ (1983) example of a brewer whowishes to know how likely a particular production
method yields a broken bottle. A reasonable method is for the brewer to treat this risk actuarially and
approximate the probability of a breakage from an empirical sample of past events. If, out of 300 bottles, the
procedure produced one broken one, the brewer would say the probability of a broken bottle using this
procedure is 1/300.
Finally, Knight’s term ‘‘estimates’’ refers to situations of utter uncertainty, in which ‘‘there is no valid
basis of any kind for classifying instances’’ (Knight, 1921, p. 225) or, in other words, where events are truly
unique and probability cannot be meaningfully applied or empirically derived. Lopes’ (1983) example of the
Miller Brewing Company deciding whether to produce Lite beer in the 1970s is an excellent example of such
an estimate. Who knew whether beer-drinking Americans would accept low-calorie beer? Miller could
merely speculate on—or, in Knight’s terms, estimate—the beer’s success.
Allthreesituationshaveinterestingpsychologicalimplications.Situations involvingaprioriprobabilities,
for instance, raise the question of whether and how outcomes and their explicit probabilities are subjectively
evaluated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and processed (Brandsta ¨tter,
Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006, 2008; Tversky, 1969). Situations involving estimates highlight the role that a
person’s knowledge plays in forming a belief that ultimately can carry the decision (Fox & Tversky, 1998;
Tversky & Fox, 1995). Finally, the psychological analyses of situations involving statistical probabilities, the
focus of this article, beneﬁt from a framework that takes two interlocking components into account:
The cognitive algorithms and mental limitations of the human mind and the statistical structure of the
environment (of risky gambles) in which the mind operates. In other words, we suggest that a cognitive-
ecological framework can help organize ﬁndings and theories in research on statistical probabilities and
decisions from experience.
A COGNITIVE-ECOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE DESCRIPTION–EXPERIENCE GAP
NotwithstandingKnight’s(1921,p.215)emphasisontheubiquityofstatisticalprobabilitiesintherealworld,
countless investigations in psychological and economic research on decision making under risk have focused
onchoices between simple monetary gambles and probabilities akin to those involved in the roll of a die. The
kinds of probabilities commonly studied in risky choice are a priori and not statistical in nature. People are
told to consider, for instance, the choice between a prospect that offers a 10% chance towin $32 (with a 90%
chance to win nothing) and the alternative of receiving $3 for sure. This completely speciﬁed chance event
was for many decades the canonical situation in our laboratories (see Weber, Shaﬁr, & Blais, 2004).
Recently, however, a new experimental paradigm involving statistical rather than a priori probabilities has
attractedresearchers’attention.Thesimplestversionofthisparadigmpresentsrespondentswithtwogambles
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probability. People are not told anything about the properties of the gambles, but are allowed to explore each
bysamplingfromthem.Speciﬁcally,clickingonaboxtriggersarandomdrawofanoutcomefromtheassociated
set of outcomes. People are encouraged to sample until they feel conﬁdent enough to decide which box is
‘‘better,’’ in the sense that they would prefer to draw from it during a ﬁnal trial involving real monetary payoffs.
This paradigm creates a situation in which respondents can approximate the probability of each outcome
occurringfromtheirempiricalsamples.
1InKnight’s(1921)view,theythusdealwithstatisticalprobabilities,and
make, in Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev’s (2004) terminology, decisions from experience.
In studies using this paradigm, a ‘‘description–experience gap’’ (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008)
has emerged. The gap refers to the observation that respondents who make decisions from experience
involving rare events appear to have systematically different preferences than respondents who make decisions
from description based on the true properties of each gamble, or, in Knight’s (1921) terms, based on a priori
probabilities.Forexample,acrosssixproblems,Hertwigetal.(2004)foundthattheaverage(absolute)difference
between the choice proportions of an experience and a description group was 36 percentage points. This
description–experience gap has been replicated in ﬁve other studies that used the same or similar paradigms.
Table 1 shows the magnitude of the description–experience gap in those studies
2, and that in the majority of
problems the same key result emerged (rightmost column): Although rare events in decisions from
description appear to be overweighted (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), in
decisions from experience rare events receive less impact than they deserve according to their objective
probabilities. This means that gambles involving a desirable rare event (like a 10% chance to win 32 points)
were chosen more often in decisions from description than in decisions from experience, whereas gambles
involving an undesirable rare event (like a 10% chance of not winning anything when every other outcome
represents a gain) were chosen less often in decisions from description than in decisions from experience.
Why does the description–experience gap arise? From the viewpoint of a cognitive-ecological framework
(e.g., Fiedler & Juslin, 2006), a number of factors can be implicated in the gap’s emergence. Speciﬁcally,
preferences in decisions from experience can be shapedby transitions between (at least) three different levels
of representations: (a) the population level describing the ecological but unknown (to the person making the
choice) properties of each gamble; (b) the sample level describing the information about each gamble as
revealed in the sample drawn by the person making the choice; and (c) the cognitive level portraying the
sampled information after it was ﬁltered through the mind’s learning, memory, and valuation processes. A
potential fourth level of representation would be the neural level (see for example Sugrue, Corrado, &
Newsome, 2005).
In what follows, we focus on three factors that may contribute to the description–experience gap and that
belong to one of the three levels of representation, namely, payoff variability (population level), sampling
error (sample level), and memory capacity (cognitive level). We ﬁrst turn to sampling error because it has
been proposed as the key determinant of the description–experience gap.
Sampling error
An immediate cause of the gap rests in the transition from the population level to the sample level
representation. Knight (1921) anticipated the imperfection of this transition when he stated that ‘‘the
statistical treatment nevergivesclosely accurate quantitativeresults’’ (p. 215). That is, the transition from the
1Barron and Erev (2003; Erev & Barron, 2005) employed a similar paradigm, but exploration and exploitation coincided so that each
sampled observation carried information value as well as monetary value.
2Gottlieb,Weiss, and Chapman (2007) also observeda differencebetween description-and experience-based choices.Unfortunately, the
majorityof theirproblemsdo notallowa clear predictionaboutwhich optionshould be preferreddependingon the impact of rare events.
It is therefore not included in Table 1.
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Journal of Behavioral Decision Makingpopulation to the sample introduces error via the sampling process itself, and consequently statistical
probabilitieswillnotbeasaccurateasaprioriprobabilities.Thismeasurementerrorwill,ofcourse,belarger,
the smaller the sample. Indeed, Hertwig et al. (2004) observed that the typical number of draws respondents
madewas approximately sevenfromeach payoffdistribution.As Table 1shows,subsequent studies observed
similarly small samples.
As Hertwig et al. (2004) pointed out, sampling error stemming from small samples can account for rare
events receiving less impact than they deserve according to their objective probabilities: Owing to the
skewness of the binomial distribution with low p, small ns make it more likely that a person encounters
rare events less frequently than expected (n
 p) (for details, see Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006). That is, rare
events are more likely to be undersampled than oversampled in small samples, and as a result the psychological
impact of rare events is attenuated. In addition, with small samples, the range of probabilities that can be
conveyed is restricted. For instance, a sample of size seven can never truly reﬂect a probability of .1.
Although sampling error undoubtedly is crucially implicated in the emergence of the description–
experience gap (e.g., Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008), it is not the whole story. Hau et al. (2008) have
provided a comprehensive investigation of the impact of sample size and undersampling of rare events. By
encouraging participants to take larger samples (either via instruction or increased monetary stakes), they
found the description–experience gap to be narrower with larger sample sizes. Yet, even with a sample as
large as 100 draws (and very accurate probability estimates), there still remained a marked gap. Ungemach,
Chater, and Stewart (2009) arrived at the same observation using a sample of 80 draws and experienced
probabilities that mimicked the described probabilities (Table 1).
Memory limits
Why does extensive experience not eliminate the gap? In the transition from the sample representation to the
cognitive representation, one intermediary process is memory which can affect how—and how much of—
the sampled information is fed into the choice process (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Gigerenzer,
Hoffrage, & Kleinbo ¨lting, 1991; Pleskac, 2007; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005; Sedlmeier, 2002). Limits in
memory (Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956) are one obvious cause underlying the description–experience gap: If a
person were able to only hold a small subset of sampled events in working memory, then this limitation—
regardless of how extensive a person’s experienced sample is—would result in a functionally small sample
from which choice is derived. Thus, limited working memory capacity could produce the same phenomenon
that genuinely small samples do: Undersampling of rare events (for a similar argument see Kareev, 2000;
Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 1997).
Typically, samples that people hold in memory are not randomly drawn from their total experience but are
skewedtowardrecentexperiences.Sucharecencyeffectcouldalsocontributetodescription–experiencegap.
Previous studies, however, have found mixed evidence regarding the occurrence of a recency effect in
decisions from experience: Hertwig et al. (2004) observed that the most recent half of sampled outcomes
predicted ultimate choices markedly better than the ﬁrst half of respondents’ experiences. In contrast, Hau
et al. (2008) found no strong recency effects. Rakow et al. (2008) only found recency effects when sampling
was self-enacted rather than imposed on respondents. Yet, they also reported that the impact of recency was
not signiﬁcantly related to participants’ working memory capacity. Let us ﬁnally turn to the ﬁrst level of
representation, the population level, which captures the objective properties of the gambles—properties that
decision makers can only peek at through the window of their samples.
Payoff variability
One objective property of monetary gambles is the variability of the payoffs, which in technical terms is
deﬁned as the pooled standard deviation of the average outcome in a particular pair of gambles. Interestingly,
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payoffs (Allais, 1953; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Erev& Barron, 2005; Markowitz,1959). For example,
the cognitive processes assumed by decision ﬁeld theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) imply that the
probability of choosing gamble A over gamble B is an increasing function of the ratio
vA   vB ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d2
A þ d2
B
q
where vA and vB are the expected values and d2
A and d2
B are the variances of the payoffs in gambles A and B,
respectively. From this assumption follows that as payoff variability increases, the predicted choice
proportions approach .5. Studies that have lent support to this prediction have relied on statistical
(experienced) rather than a priori (described) probabilities (Busemeyer, 1985; Erev & Barron, 2005; Katz,
1962; Myers & Katz, 1962; Myers & Sadler, 1960). This raises the question of whether the effect of payoff
variability is format dependent, and only inﬂuences decisions from experience but not decisions from
description. If so, then this format dependency of the payoff variability effect would provide one novel
candidate explanation for the description–experience gap.
For illustration, consider Problems 1 and 2 investigated by Hertwig et al. (2004):
Problem 1 Problem 2
A ½s ¼ 1:6  4 with p ¼ :80 C ½s ¼ 1:6  4 with p ¼ :20
0 with p ¼ :20 0 with p ¼ :80
B ½s ¼ 0  3 with p ¼ 1:00 D ½s ¼ 1:3  3 with p ¼ :25
with p ¼ :75
In the experience group, a majority (88%) selected the risky option A in Problem 1, relative to a minority
in the description group (36%). In Problem 2, the minority of the experience group (44%) selected option C,
relativetothemajorityinthedescriptiongroup(64%).Problems1and2offergambleswithidenticalpossible
earnings,buttheprobabilityofwinningisscaleddown(byafactoroffour),thusreducingacertainoptiontoa
chance prospect. In the description group, the change in preference from Problems 1 to 2 represents a
violation of the substitution axiom of utility theory and has been taken as evidence for prospect theory’s
assumed overweighting of rare events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). At the
same time, the opposite preference pattern in the experience group is consistent with the attenuated impact of
rare events, namely, event ‘‘0’’ (Problem 1) and ‘‘4’’ (Problem 2), respectively.
Alternatively, however, the change in preference in the experiencegroup might have been triggered by the
increased payoff variability in Problem 2 (relative to Problem 1):
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1:62 þ 1:32 p
¼ 2:1 relative to ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1:62 þ 02 p
¼ 1:6. As payoff variability has been assumed to render choice more random, choices in the
experience group may have simply become more random from Problem 1 to Problem 2 (88 to 44%). Payoff
variability can also explain the change in preference between Problem 5 (32 with a probability of .1 or 3 for
certain) and Problem 6 (32 with a probability of .025 and 3 for certain) in Hertwig et al. (2004). Several
investigations of decisions from experience (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hau et al., 2008; Jessup, Bishara, &
Busemeyer,2008; Rakowetal.,2008; Ungemachetal.,2009)haveusedthesameset ofproblemsorincluded
some or all of the problems investigated by Hertwig et al. (2004) in their problem set. Consequently, payoff
variability may be a previously unsuspected culprit behind a larger set of ﬁndings in research on decisions
from experience.
OUR STUDIES
The description–experience gap has been explained in terms of sampling error and memory limits (e.g.,
recency).Wehaveintroducedanotherpossibleexplanationthatisrelatedtoanobjectivepropertyofgambles,
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these factors to thegap. InStudy 1, we manipulated the occurrence of rare eventsand payoff variabilityof the
gambles independently. We could do so easily, by slightly changing the previously used decisions from
experience paradigm. Respondents were presented with one described certain outcome, and an unknown
gamble from which they could sample (see also Busemeyer, 1985). This set-up had the additional advantage
of giving us greater control over a person’s sampling process: It allowed us to study how a person’s choices
alter as a function of the increasing experience about one gamble, and to aggregate choices from different
respondents because they acquired the same amount of experience.
Still another goal of Study 1 is to investigate the effect of memory limits by removing the need to keep
one’s sampled experience in memory—a condition that we call decisions from records. If decisions from
records deviate from decisions from experience (given otherwise identical information), this may imply that
memorylimitscontributetothedescription–experiencegap.InStudy2,weaddressedanotherfactorthatmay
contribute to the gap and that is located in the cognitive pillar of the cognitive-ecological framework. Even if
information in decisions from description and experience were mathematically equivalent, it might not be so
psychologically. Speciﬁcally, we examined the question to what extent a priori probabilities and statistical
probabilities are psychologically different, giventhat the latter tend to be experienced in terms offrequencies
and not probabilities.
STUDY 1: DO PAYOFF VARIABILITY AND MEMORY LIMITS MATTER?
Method
Design
Study 1 had four independent variables: Representation format (experience, records, and description) varied
between participants, payoff variability (3 levels), probability of winning (4 levels), and sample-size (5
levels) varied within participants.
Participants
A total of 120 students from the University of Basel participated. Forty participants were each randomly
assigned to one of three groups: Experience, records and description.
Stimuli
Weconstructed12decisionproblems(Table2)thatallowedustosystematicallyincreasepayoffvariabilityin
one option (the risky option), while keeping it constant in the second option (the certain option). The risky
option in each problem yields x Swiss Francs with probability p and 0 with probability 1 p. Problems
represent all combinations of four levels of probability p (.1, .2, .8, .9) and three levels of payoff variability
(s¼1.60, 4.50, and 9.60 Swiss Francs). The probabilities are chosen such that either gain x or outcome ‘‘0’’
represents a low-probability event.
Thecertain optiontrackedthe expectedvalueofthe riskyoption,exceptthatforhalfoftheparticipantsthe
value of the certain option was reduced by 0.20 Swiss Francs and for the other half of participants the value
was augmented by 0.20 Francs. Respondents received course credit and, in addition, were informed that they
would be paid according to one of their decisions, randomly selected after all choices were completed.
Respondents’ payoffs ranged between 0 and 32 Swiss Francs. The stimuli were presented on a PC running
e-prime 1.1.
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In all three groups, respondents selected their preferred option by pressing one of two buttons on a standard
keyboard. Options were displayed on the monitor, divided by a central vertical line, with the position of risky
and certain option randomly determined. The order of the problems was also randomized. In the description
group, respondents were presented with a description of the risky option (e.g., 4 with a probability of 80%, 0
otherwise) displayed opposite to that of the certain option (e.g., 3 with certainty).
In the experience group, respondents initially did not know the outcomes and associated probabilities in
the risky option. Before choosing between the risky and certain option, they were instructed to explore the
risky option—graphically represented in terms of a deck of cards—by sampling from it. Pressing a key
elicitedthe samplingofacard fromthisdeck.Thecard,with the outcome printed onit, wasthen displayedon
the screen until the next card replaced it. After the ﬁrst ﬁve draws, the deck of cards was displayed opposite a
written description of the certain option (i.e., 3 with certainty). Participants were asked to make a choice.
Subsequently, they were instructed to continue sampling. Again, after ﬁve draws, a choice was requested. In
total, participants made ﬁve choices per problem, having sampled 5, 10, 20, 35, and 50 cards, respectively.
This manipulation enabled us to track—within each person and problem—how choice changes as a function
of growing experience. The sequences of cards respondents experienced were constructed as follows: For
each deck, we created 20 random sequences of 50 cards using a computerized random-generator. Each
sequence was employed for two respondents, one whose certain option was augmented, and one whose
certain option was reduced, relative to the expected value of the risky option.
The records group was identical to the experience group, except for two differences. First, each sampling
from the deck yielded an episode comprising several outcomes rather than one. Thus, prior to each choice a
respondent would receive all new information simultaneously. Second, prior to their choices (as in the
experience group, ﬁve per problem) all outcomes that had been sampled up to that point were displayed in
front of them. That is, records of all past experiences were openly accessible, thus reducing—or even
eliminating—the burden on memory during decision making. For illustration, Figure 1 depicts a shot of the
screen encountered by a respondent who had experienced 35 outcomes from the risky deck of cards in
Problem 9 (Table 2), and who on the next screen would be asked to make a choice. The records group saw
exactly the same random sequences as the experience group.
Table 2. The 12 choice problems used in studies 1 and 2
No. pwin
1 Xwin
1 s
1 Certain option
2
1 10 5.30 1.60 0.30/0.70
2 20 4 1.60 0.60/1.00
3 80 4 1.60 3.00/3.40
4 90 5.30 1.60 4.60/5.00
5 10 15 4.50 1.30/1.70
6 20 11.30 4.50 2.10/2.50
7 80 11.30 4.50 8.80/9.20
8 90 15 4.50 13.30/13.70
9 10 32 9.60 3.00/3.40
10 20 24 9.60 11.80/12.20
11 80 24 9.60 19.00/19.40
12 90 32 9.60 28.60/29.00
1Each problem consists of a riskyoption—represented by a deck of cards—paying Xwin Swiss Francs with probability pwin, 0 otherwise,
coupled with a certain option. Payoff variability is indicated by the standard deviation s of the risky option.
2For half of the participants, the certain option was the expected value of the risky option augmented by 0.20 Swiss Francs; for the other
half, it was reduced by the same amount; 1 Swiss Franc¼US $0.95.
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Although the statistical analyses reported herewere conducted usingall ﬁvelevelsof sample size, forreasons
of simplicity we focus on the choices made after 5 and 50 draws, respectively. All subsequent conclusions
drawn from comparing these two extreme sample sizes, however, are consistent with the trends that emerge
for the intermediary sample sizes (see Appendix for a detailed summary of choices across all sample sizes).
As a ﬁrst step, we checked whether we were able to replicate two ﬁndings of previous studies. First, the
risky option of our Problem 3 (4; .8) has been studied by Hertwig et al. (2004) and Hau et al. (2008). In both
studies, the majority of respondents making decisions from experience preferred the risky option to a certain
option of similar expected value. We found similar preferences in our experience and records groups: 55 and
62% respondents chose the risky option in the experience and records groups, respectively. Secondly,
Hertwig et al. and Hau et al. found the risky option of Problem 9 (32; .1) to be less preferred than the certain
option. Echoing this result, we found that merely 27 and 32% of respondents in the experience and records
groups chose the risky option. These ﬁndings suggest that our new method yielded results similar to those
observed previously.
We now turn to the extent to which more experience reduces the description–experience gap and then
examinetheimpactofpayoffvariability,andmemorylimits.Weshouldpointoutthatweconductedallofour
statistical analyses by conditioning on one effect. So, to examine the effect of rare events we formed choice
proportions by averaging across the different levels of variability. To examine the effect of payoff variability,
we averaged across different levels of probability to win.
The role of more experience
Respondentsintheexperienceandrecordsgroups,respectively,chosebetweentheriskyandcertainoptionafter
anexperienceof5,10,20,35,and50draws.Ascanbeexpectedfromthelawoflargenumbers,alargernresulted
in a more veridical experience of the outcomes’ probabilities in the risky option. When, for example, people
sampledn¼5times,themeanabsolutedifferencebetweentheobjectiveandexperiencedprobabilitieswas12.3
(median¼10)percentagepoints,relativeto8.2(n¼10,md¼10),5.5(n¼20,md¼5),4.8(n¼35,md¼4.3),
and ﬁnally 4.1 percentage points (md¼4) in the case of n¼50 sampled outcomes.
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
32,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
32,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
32,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
SFr.
0,-
Figure 1. Screenshot displaying a sample of 35 cards in Problem 9 as seen by a respondent in the records group
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that selected the risky option as a function of probability p and of sample size (Figure 2a: 5 draws;
Figure2b:50 draws) averagingacross levelsofpayoffvariability.Thelower rowshows the choice proportion
as a function of payoff variability and sample size (Figure 2c: 5 draws; Figure 2d: 50 draws) averaging across
probability p (we return to the effects of probability shortly). These ﬁgures illustrate that the impact of
additional experience was small. The mean absolute difference for choice proportions between the
experience and the description groups was 24, 23, 23, 21, and 20 percentage points, respectively, for
n¼5, n¼10, n¼20, n¼35, and n¼50 samples. That is, in this new set of problems we again found a
large and systematic experience–description gap that shrinks with more experience. The reduction,
however, was small given that the difference between objective and experienced probabilities shrank from
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(d) Sample Size 50
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Figure 2. Mean proportion of choices of the risky option in the description, experience, and records groups as a function
of probability to win based on a sample of size 5 (Figure 2a) and size 50 (Figure 2b), respectively, and as a function of
payoff variability based on a sample of size 5 (Figure 2c) and 50 (Figure 2d), respectively. Error bars indicate 1S Eo f
the mean. For every level of sample size and at every level of probability or payoff variability, signiﬁcant differences of
choice proportions between decisions from experience and decisions from description are marked by asterisks (
 p<.05;
  p<.01;
   p<.001); signiﬁcant differences between decisions from records and decisions from description are marked
by hash marks (
#p<.05;
##p<.01;
###p<.001)
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play a role as well.
Two ANOVAs shed lighton thegap: A5 3 4‘‘rare eventANOVA’’ anda 5 3 3‘‘payoffvariability
ANOVA.’’ Both ANOVAs had sample size (5 levels, within-subjects) and group (3 levels, between-subjects)
as factors. The rare-event ANOVA treated probability to win as a factor (4 levels, within-subjects) while
averaging across variability, whereas the payoff-variability ANOVA treated payoff variability (3 levels,
within-subjects) as a factor while averaging across levels of probability. In both ANOVAs, the main effect of
sample size was not signiﬁcant (Frare events(4, 468)¼1.06, p¼.38, h
2¼.009; Fpayoff variability(4, 468)¼0.86,
p¼.49, h
2¼.007).
The role of rare events
The differences in choices in Figures 2a and 2b are consistent with the implied opposite impact of the rare
event in decisions from description and experience, observed by Hertwig et al. (2004). Respondents in the
experience and records groups preferred the certain to the risky option when the probability towin was small
(p¼.1), suggesting that this desirable but unlikely gain had less impact than in the description group, which
arrived at the opposite preference. The pattern reversed when p became large (p¼.8 and p¼.9), and by
extension,the rareeventprovedtobethe undesirable‘‘0’’outcome.Then,the descriptiongrouppreferredthe
certain option, whereas the experience group was more likely to choose the risky option, although the
strength of their preference for the risky option was modest (i.e., close to 50%). The only exception from this
general pattern of signiﬁcantly different choice proportions between description and experience occurred at
p¼.2, for which all three groups expressed a similar preference.
The rare-event ANOVA conﬁrms that rare events inﬂuenced the groups’ choices differentially. The
interaction between probability to win and group is signiﬁcant (Frare events (6, 351)¼13.46, p<.001,h
2¼.187).
This pattern is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by sample size as the non-signiﬁcant interaction between the
probability to win group sample size implies, Frare events (24, 1404)¼1.00, p¼.46, h
2¼.017.
3
The role of payoff variability
Figures 2c and 2d plot the choice proportions of the riskyoption as a function of payoff variability. Across all
three groups, there is a tendency to choose the certain option the larger the payoff variability in the risky
option, regardless of sample size (compare Figures 2c and 2d). This main effect is conﬁrmed by the payoff-
variability ANOVA (Fpayoff variability (2, 234)¼10.31, p<.001, h
2¼.081), which ﬁnds no interaction of
payoff variability and group (Fpayoff variability (4, 351)¼0.05, p¼.48, h
2¼.015) or of payoff variability,
group and sample size (Fpayoff variability (16, 936)¼0.04, p<.43, h
2¼.017). This lack of interaction suggests
thatpayoffvariabilityisnotlikelytobethesourceofthedescription–experiencegap:Itdoesnotinﬂuencethe
two kinds of decisions differentially. Therefore, and also because rare events did in fact have a differential
impact, we will focus on the probability to win in all further analyses.
4
3Note that the change in preference with rare events in the experience and records groups is also consistent with Weber et al.’s (2004)
phenomenological use of the coefﬁcient of variation to predict risk taking. Speciﬁcally, as the coefﬁcient of variation increases people
becomeless risk seekingandchoose thecertain option.Dueto the procedureswe usedto constructourgamblesa changeincoefﬁcient of
variation is perfectly correlated with a change in the rare event. Because our focus is on the process level, we interpret the effect in terms
of the effect of rare events. However, future research should experimentally investigate these different concepts.
4The conclusion that the rare event—not payoff variability—matters for the description–experience gap is further corroborated by an
ANOVAinwhichwecollapsedacrossallsamplesizesandincludedpayoffvariability,probabilitytowinandgroupasfactors.Therewere
no signiﬁcant variability group (F(4, 234)¼0.79, p¼.54, h
2¼.013), variability probability (F(6, 702)¼1.30, p¼.25, h
2¼.011),
or variability probability group (F(12, 702)¼0.07, p¼.53, h
2¼.015) interactions, but there was a signiﬁcant probability group
interaction (F(6, 351)¼13.46, p<.001, h
2¼.187).
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The experience and the records groups encountered the same sequences of outcomes. The key difference
between the groups was that people in the records group did not need to rely on their memory to evaluate the
risky option. Yet, choices in both groups are surprisingly similar (Figure 2). This may not be surprising when
the sample size is small (Figure 2a). The pattern, however, also holds when people had to commit a large
sequence of 50 draws to their memory (Figure 2b; see Appendix for similar conclusions about the
intermediate sample sizes). There is only one large, signiﬁcant difference between both groups; it occurs
when the probability of winning equals .9 (t(78)¼2.16, p¼.034). Interestingly, however, this difference is
such that the records group has an even stronger preference than the experience group for the risky option,
thus making thegapwiththe descriptiongroupevenlarger.These resultssuggest thatmemorylimitsare nota
major source of the description–experience gap.
Choice inertia
One possible reason why the description–experiencegap does not disappear with larger samples is simple
choice inertia (Biele, Erev, & Ert, 2009). That is, people might just stick with the option they initially
chose. To test this hypothesis, we determined the average overlap between subsequent choices (i.e., ﬁrst
and second decision, second and third, and so on). The mean overlap was 84% in both the experience
and records groups. Although this may seems like an instance of inertia, one has to keep in mind that
choices are bound to overlap simply because earlier, smaller samples represent subsets of later, larger
samples. To quantify the inﬂuence of this dependency, we simulated the choices of respondents who face
the same samples that our participants encountered, and employed the natural-mean heuristic (Hau et al.,
2008; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2008): They choose the risky option if their sample has a better average
outcome than the certain option. The average overlap among these simulated choices was 79%, and the
observed overlap is only slightly larger than that predicted by the natural-mean heuristic. Consequently,
choice inertia is unlikely to explain the substantial description–experience gap even for large samples
(Figure 2b).
To conclude, we found a large description–experience gap, and thereby observed choices that are
consistent with the thesis that rare events have more impact in description-based than in experience-based
choices, as suggested by Barron and Erev (2003), Hertwig et al. (2004), and Weber et al. (2004). In
addition, the gap cannot be explained in terms of limited memory, choice inertia, or payoff variability—
the ﬁrst two factors belonging to the cognitive pillar of the cognitive-ecological framework and
payoff variability belonging to the ecological pillar. Finally, sampling error matters but the gap did not
decreaseinequalmeasureasthedecreasingerror:Speciﬁcally,wefoundthat10timesasmuchexperience
(50 vs. 5 draws) slightly reduced but by no means eliminated the gap. Sampling error is not the only game
in town.
STUDY 2: DOES REPRESENTATION FORMAT MATTER?
Statistical probabilities and a priori probabilities differ insofar as the latter can be deduced from logical or
other principles, and the former must be inferred from experience. Moreover, both kinds of probability also
differ with regard to their representation format. The large majority of studies investigating risky choice
represent the chance of described outcomes in terms of single-event probabilities (or percentages). In
contrast, the reliance on experience in generating statistical probabilities leaves it to decision makers to
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single-event probabilities. This begs the question: Does the format of statistical probabilities inﬂuence the
effect of rare events on decisions from experience?
Indeed, Rakow et al. (2008) suggested that the effect of rare events—via sampling error—is so
pervasive that the format of the information does not matter and that the description–experience gap is
tantamount to a population-sample gap. In terms of a cognitive-ecological framework, they thus
argued that the description–experience gap is entirely explained by the transition from the latent
population representation to the sample representation. A corollary of their thesis is that a person’s
cognitive representation of the properties of the gambles is either identical in decisions from description
and decisions from experience, or if different, inconsequential. Some evidence from studies on
probabilistic reasoning, however, conﬂict with this corollary. Speciﬁcally, Gigerenzer and colleagues
found evidence that many cognitive illusions—biases in probabilistic reasoning—disappear or are
reduced when uncertainty is communicated in terms of evolved representations of information such as
natural frequencies rather than in terms of single-event probabilities (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Hoffrage, Lindsey,
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). These authors’ ﬁndings and conclusions have produced a heated and
ongoing debate (e.g., Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Sloman, Over, Slovak, &
Stibel, 2003).
In the context of risky choice, Gottlieb, Weiss, and Chapman (2007) indeed found that single-
event probabilities are processed differently than other representation formats. Our Study 2 builds on
this work and asks: To what extent does risky choice depend on how information about gambles is
represented, and can the description–experience gap in part be attributed to the fact that experience-
based and description-based choices invoke different representations? To this end, we adopt the same
yoking procedure that Rakow et al. (2008) used, and from which they concluded that the description–
experience gap is a population-sample gap. Speciﬁcally, we take the same statistical probabilities as
experienced by our respondents in Study 1, and represent them in terms of percentages. Thereby,
respondents in both studies receive mathematically equivalent information, merely represented in
different formats. One group encountered the information in terms of sequentially experienced outcomes
(experience group in Study 1), the other in terms of described probabilities (yoked description
group in Study 2). If, notwithstanding mathematical equivalence, different choices emerge, then the
description–experience gap is not solely a function of the transition from a latent population to a
sample—the population-sample gap—but also a result of the transition from a sample to its cognitive
representation.
Method
Participants
Forty students of the University of Basel took part in this study, recruited from the same pool as used in
Study 1.
Procedure
Each participant was matched up with a ‘‘twin’’ in the experience group of Study 1, and was exposed to the
information experienced by that twin. Consequently, each participant had to make ﬁve repeated choices for
eachofthetwelvedecisionproblems.Forexample,aparticipantinStudy1mayhaveseenthesequence32,0,
0, 32, 32 prior to choosing between the risky option and the certain option of 29 in Problem 12. The
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‘‘100% chance to win 29.’’
To avoid confusion, participants were informed that the risky option could change between each of ﬁve
subsequent choices
5; that they might have to make the same choice more than once; and that some choices
might be trivial (e.g., when, due to sampling error, the risky option dominated the certain option). The
payoff scheme was identical to that in Study 1, with one randomly selected decision played out for
money.
Results and discussion
Does representation format matter? Figure 3 reports participants’ choice proportions for the risky option in
Study 2 along with those of their twins in Study 1. Let us ﬁrst turn to choices based on ﬁve draws (Figure 3a).
The twins prove to be twins. The patterns of choices in both the experience group and Study 2’s yoked
description group track each other. Both groups prefer the certain option at low probabilities and the risky
option with high probabilities of winning. To provide a simpliﬁed analysis of this trend, we compared the
average choices for the risky option for low (.1 and .2) and high probabilities (.8 and .9). The difference is
signiﬁcant both for the experience group (t(39)¼4.37, p<.001) and for their twins in the yoked description
group (t(39)¼5.02, p<.001). In addition, as Figure 3a shows, the trend in the yoked description group runs
opposite to that of the description group in Study 1 (negative trend, t(39)¼ 3.07, p¼.004). At this point,
onecannothelpbutconcludethatthereisnosystematicdescription–experiencegaponcerespondentsreceive
mathematically equivalent information. That is, representation format in risky choice does not matter and the
gap is indeed a population-sample gap.
This conclusion, however, proves premature once results in the remaining panels of Figure 3b–e enter
the picture. Here, choices are based on increasingly larger sample sizes, up to a maximum of 50. Twins
ain’t twins no more. With more experience, the yoked description group becomes increasingly dissimilar
to the experience group. At sample size 50, there is a substantial difference between the yoked
description (Study 2) and the experience groups (Study 1). This gradual change is conﬁrmed by the results of
a 5 (sample size) 2 (group, experience and yoked description) 4 (probability to win) ANOVA. The
sample size group  probability interaction is signiﬁcant (F(12, 936)¼2.50, p¼.003, h
2¼.031),
conﬁrming that rare events drive apart decisions from experience and yoked decisions from description as
sample size increases. Furthermore, at sample size 50 there is no signiﬁcant difference between the average
choices for the low and high probabilities evident in the yoked description group any more (t(39)¼ 0.42,
p¼.68).
Lastbutnotleast,becausetheexperienceandrecordsgroupsinStudy1receivedidenticalinformation,the
twinsof Study2wereactually triplets. The information that the respondents inStudy 2receivedmatchedthat
encountered by respondents in the experience as well as in the records group in Study 1. Therefore, we also
conducted all the analyses reported above, comparing the records group (Study 1) and the yoked description
group (Study 2). We found nearly identical results.
These ﬁndings imply that mathematical equivalence does not necessarily constitute psychological
equivalence.Representation formatdoesmatterandthegapcannotbesimplyreduced toapopulation-sample
gap. Perhaps, the most puzzling result from Study 2 is that decisions from experience and yoked decisions
from description coincide for small sample sizes and diverge for large ones. Why is that? There is an
interesting and testable answer that we outline in the following discussion.
5In Study1, respondents were informedthat from one trial to the next, theywould learnmore information about a stableunderlyingrisky
option. This instruction would have been incomprehensible in Study 2.
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(c) Sample Size 20
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(d) Sample Size 35
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(e) Sample Size 50
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Figure 3. Mean proportion of choices of the risky option in the experience (Study 1) and yoked description (Study 2)
groups as a function of probability to win and sample size (5 in Figure 3a to 50 in Figure 3e). For comparison, we also
included choices of the description group in Study 1 in all ﬁgures. Error bars indicate 1 SE of the mean. For every level
of sample size and at every level of probability, signiﬁcant differences of choice proportions between decisions from
experience and yoked decisions from description are marked by asterisks (
 p<.05;
  p<.01); signiﬁcant differences
between decisions fromdescription withobjectiveprobabilitiesandyoked decisions fromdescriptionare markedby hash
marks (
#p<.05;
##p<.01;
###p<.001)
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Dichotomies are seductively simplistic. We began by pointing out that the distinction between situations of
risk and uncertainty, typically attributed to Knight (1921), was originally a trichotomy of probability
situations: If decision makers are in risky situations they can either have a priori probabilities or statistical
probabilities and if they are in uncertain situations they will only have their estimates (or beliefs) to act on.
From there, it is easy to see how the distinction between decisions from description and decisions from
experience(e.g.,Barron&Erev,2003;Hertwigetal.,2004;Weberetal.,2004)mapontoKnight’sdistinction
between a priori and statistical probabilities. But even Knight’s trichotomy is simplistic. As Knight himself
pointed out, perhaps a better conceptualization is of a continuum of different decision-making situations
anchored by three different poles of decisions made from description, decisions made from experience, and
decisions made from estimates or beliefs (see p. 199).
We pursued two goals. First, we tested the robustness of the description–experience gap by using choice
problems not previously studied. The problems consisted of a safe option and a risky option. Like in
Busemeyer (1985), respondents merely sampled the risky option, as the safe option was explicitly described
as such. In this paradigm, which combines one ‘‘described option’’ and one ‘‘experienced option,’’ we again
found a substantial description–experience gap (Figures 2a and 2b). That is, the gap generalizes to tasks that
combined aprioriand statisticalprobabilities.Thesecondgoal was tofurther ourunderstandingofthe causes
behind the gap, using a cognitive-ecological framework that organizes potential causes. What did we ﬁnd in
Study1?Bypittingtheimpactofrareeventsagainstthepossibleimpactofpayoffvariability(bothecological
factors), we observed that the latter could hardly explain the gap. Speciﬁcally, choices in both the description
and experience groups were inﬂuenced by payoff variability, but its effect failed to explain differences
between the groups. Moreover, we also could absolve capacity limits in memory (a cognitive factor) of
responsibilityforthegap.Decisionsfromrecords,inwhichparticipantssawthetotalsequenceofdrawswhen
making a decision and in which memory was not taxed, produced a description–experience gap that, if
anything, was even larger than that for decisions from experience (Figures 2a and 2b). Last but not least, the
fact that the gap was not eliminated after substantial experience in both the experience and records group
indicates that sampling error—although undoubtedly a contributory factor to the gap (Hertwig et al., 2004;
Hau et al., 2008)—is insufﬁcient to account for the whole story.
By combining a priori and statistical probabilities, our experimental task also allowed us to eliminate
another possible explanation for the description–experience gap. In decisions from description involving a
priori probabilities, the certainty effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) refers to the theoretical interpretation
that people overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable,
and to the empirical observation that certain gains are preferred over their probabilistic counterparts with
similar expected values. In decisions from experience involving statistical probabilities, certainty is
unattainable. If this lack of certainty had contributed to the description–experience gap in previous studies,
our respondents in the experience group would have ﬂocked to the described, certain option. We found no
such ﬂight into certainty. In fact, our respondents took considerable risks, predominately in problems where
the risky option promised only slightly higher gains than the certain option (i.e., a 90% chance to win 32
Swiss Francs vs. a certain option of 29 Swiss Francs).
In Study 2, we adopted a clever procedure that Rakow et al. (2008) employed. Speciﬁcally, we created a
twin experience by representing the statistical probabilities encountered in Study 1’s experience group to
another group; this time, however, in terms of a priori probabilities. Thereby, respondents in Study 2 relived
the other group’s experience but in a different representation format. The results were striking. With small
samples we observed no differential impact of representation format. With large samples, however, we found
that mathematically equivalent representation formats produced different patterns of choice. It appears that
the frequency–probability divide, so powerful in research on statistical reasoning (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991), is
alsoofimportance in riskychoice. In whatfollows, we address two issues. First, Figure 3(Study 2) shows the
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reappears. Second, why does representation format—a priori probabilities versus statistical probabilities—
matter in risky choice?
The ampliﬁcation effect: When choices become trivial
Recently,HertwigandPleskac(2008) showedthatsmallsamplesamplifythedifferencebetweentheoptions’
average rewards. They suggested that this ampliﬁcation effect might ease the difﬁculty of choosing between
options, thus explaining why respondents in decisions from experience studies are content with relatively
small samples (Table 1). According to the ampliﬁcation effect, small samples tend to make the differences
betweengambles on average largerthan the population level difference thereby making choices less difﬁcult.
To appreciate the magnitude of the ampliﬁcation effect as a function of sample size, we calculated, for all
participants and problems in Study 1, the absolute difference between the value of the certain option and the
sample mean (i.e., the mean of all outcomes in a sample) of the risky option. The average median differences
were 1.30 and0.44 Swiss Francsforsample sizes 5and 50, respectively.Recall thegambleswereconstructed
so that the objective difference in expected values was 0.20 Swiss Francs. That is, the median difference
between the two options based on a sample of 5 was about 300% larger than that based on a sample involving
50 draws (and 650% larger than the objective differences in expected values).
The ampliﬁcation effect can perhaps help us understand some of the results in Study 2 (Figure 3). Recall the
yoked-description group saw described (a priori) probabilities in Study 2 that were completely identical to the
experienced(statistical)probabilitiesinStudy1.Focusingonsmallsamples,itisnotsurprisingthatwefoundno
difference between theyoked description andexperiencegroups. For instance, a personwho read the description
ofa‘‘100%chancetowin0’’(vs.acertainpayoff)islikelytoconcurwithapersonwhosampledasequenceof0,
0, 0, 0, 0. The ampliﬁcation effect also applies to Rakow et al.’s (2008) ﬁnding of no description–experience gap
when respondents saw a description of the probabilities experienced by another group. In fact, we reanalyzed
their data (which they graciously provided), adapting the analysis above. Again, we found an ampliﬁcation
effect:Basedonamediansampleof15outcomes,themedianabsolutedifferencebetweenthesamplemeanswas
2, a 1500% increase from the median difference between the objective expected values of 0.125 (presented in
their decisions from description condition). They and we thus observed the impact of the ampliﬁcation effect.
Increasing sample size and thus reducing sampling error, however, had a differential impact on decisions
from experience and yoked decisions from description. As Figure 3 shows, with larger samples, the yoked
description group became more similar to the description group and less similar to the experience group. The
choices in the experience group remained largely unchanged as a function of sample size. One might have
expected that with increasing sample size, the ampliﬁcation effect gets smaller and thereby the description-
experience gap should get smaller as well. This, however, only holds if the ampliﬁcation effect and the
associated sampling error were the only causes underlying the gap. Results in Hau et al. (2008) and Study 1
show that this is not the case.
To conclude, the ampliﬁcation effect and sampling error contribute to the description-experience gap,
because decisions from description are devoid of sampling error. For small samples, the ampliﬁcation effect is
so large that when we introduced the sampling error of decisions from experience into yoked decisions from
description, then choices became trivial in both representation formats and removed any difference in choice.
But, when the ampliﬁcation effect dissipated in larger samples, the gap reappeared. This suggests two things.
First, thegap should only be expected when choices are not trivial. Second, in these non-trivial choices, factors
other than sampling error—some of which we discussed in this article—contribute to the gap.
Risky choice: Why does representation format matter?
Figure 3e shows a description–experience gap, notwithstanding the fact that choices are based on
mathematicallyequivalentinformation. Theinformation onlydifferedintherepresentationformat,statistical
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choices? We can think of two reasons: one concerns the weighting of monetary outcomes, the other concerns
triggeringofcognitiveheuristics.InHauetal.(2008;Figure7,Table6;seealsoJessupetal.,2008),wefound
that prospect theory’s S-shaped decision-weighting function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), embodying
overweighting of low- and medium probability events and underweighting of common events, is not well
suited to model choices based on experienced frequencies. The optimal, ﬁtted parameters proved very close
to unity. That is, to the extent that monetary outcomes are explicitly weighted by their likelihood in decisions
from experience, the weights equal the experienced frequencies. In decisions from description, in contrast,
Edwards (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggested a weighting
pattern that systematically deviates from the stated probabilities.
A second explanation, also suggested by Hau et al. (2008), is that decisions from experience and
description trigger different decision strategies. Some models that have been proposed to account for
experience-basedchoices arenotapplicableto decisionsfromdescription.Forinstance,associativelearning
models as well as simple strategies such as the natural-mean heuristic require no representation of
probabilities, nor do they invoke the multiplication of some function of monetary outcomes by some
function of their likelihoods as assumed by Neo-Bernoullian models entertained in decisions from
description such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cumulative prospect theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992), thetransfer-of-attention-exchange model(Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997),ordecisionaffect
theory (Mellers, 2000).
CONCLUSION
In 1983, Lola Lopes, reﬂecting on the psychological concept of risk, wrote:
After 30 years or more of research on risk, we know a lot about how people make decisions about simple
lotteries, but we know remarkably little about decision under uncertainty, possibly because we have not
had a good laboratory model of uncertainty. (p. 138)
Not too long ago, one could have rightfully extended this assessment to the ‘‘extremely common’’
(Knight, 1921; p. 215) situations in which we need to base our decisions on statistical, rather than a priori,
probabilities.Now,however,wehavesomesimpliﬁedlaboratorymodelsofthesechoicesinvolvingstatistical
probabilities (for a review see Erev & Haruvy, in press; Hertwig & Erev, in press; see also Pleskac, 2008).
These paradigms allow us to investigate key cognitive processes often absent in the study of simple lotteries
such as search for information, termination of search, memory retrieval, and mental tabulation of risks.
Moreover, these models enable comparisons between decisions made in response to lotteries involving
described probabilities and decisions involving experienced probabilities. These comparisons have revealed
a substantial description–experience gap. In the process of understanding the causes and boundaries of this
gap, researchers have the chance, so we believe, to develop a richer conception of not only the cognitive, but
also the ecological aspects underlying risky decisions in the real world.
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